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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CITY ERRONEOUSLY RELIES ON THE "COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE STOP" TEST IN ANALYZING THE 
PROPRIETY OF OFFICER HEDENSTROM'S WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
MR. DAVIDSON. 
In its (Corrected) Brief of Appellee, the City argues that Officer Hedenstrom's 
warrantless search may be upheld if he was acting in his capacity as a "community caretaker" and 
exigent circumstances created an imminent danger to life or limb. In making this argument, the 
City relies solely on the case of Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), in 
which this Court established a three tiered test for community caretaker automobile stops. The 
City's reliance on Provo City is misplaced for several reasons. 
First, the City assumes that the test set forth in Provo City applies equally to both 
automobile stops and to other types of Fourth Amendment intrusions. However, the City fails to 
recognize that Provo City and all the cases discussed therein relate to the propriety of minimally 
intrusive automobile stops, not highly invasive personal searches like that conducted by Officer 
Hedenstrom in this case. This distinction is significant and is highlighted by noting the 
differences between the automobile stop upheld in Provo City and Officer Hedenstrom's search 
of Mr. Davidson. 
In Provo City, a police officer stopped the defendant's car after being told that the 
defendant was looking for cocaine so he could "drive himself into a wall." Id at 361. The 
officer testified and the trial court found that there was no reason to believe the defendant had 
committed a crime at the time of the stop and that the only reason for the stop was a concern for 
"this person's welfare and mental stability." Id at 361-62. However, after making contact with 
the defendant, the officer noted that his breath smelled of alcohol and that he was unsteady on his 
feet. The officer administered a standard battery of field sobriety tests and then arrested the 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 361. This Court upheld the legality 
of the initial stop and established the following test for valid community caretaker automobile 
stops: 
First, the trial court must determine if a seizure occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment. Second, the court must determine whether the seizure was in pursuit 
of a bona fide community caretaker function. Third, the court must ascertain 
whether the circumstances were such that there was a reasonable belief that the 
circumstances posed an imminent danger to life or limb. 
Id at 366. 
The primary distinction to be made between Provo City and the present case is that Provo 
City is an "automobile stop" case, not a "search" case. Courts have routinely recognized that 
automobile stops are far less intrusive than searches. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648, 
661 (1979) (intrusiveness of automobile stop is limited in magnitude compared to other 
intrusions); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (intrusiveness of automobile stop 
and associated inquiry is minimal); compare State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) 
(police officer may effect traffic stop if there is reasonable suspicion of traffic or equipment 
2 
violation) with State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (n ^ - ^ nade 
following traffic stop, officer may not search automobile unless there is probable cause for the 
sea* ' ! - is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous and the search 
is limited to search for weapons). In contrast, the expectation that we will be free from a police 
officer's probing fingers is both legitimate and substantial. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,17 
(1968) (recognizing that ai I officer's search of a person "is a sen •*•:.» . le sanctity 
of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be 
undertaken lightly."). In short, automobile stops are not subject to the same Fourth Amendment 
constraints as other types of Fourth Amendment intrusions and llir sUind.ird under n hi>, h JH 
automobile stop is evaluated is not the same as the standard governing police searches of 
individuals. 
Moreover, even ifProvo City's community caretaker rationale is expanded to eiicompass 
searches of individuals, Officer Hedenstrom's search of Mr. Davidson cannot be justified as a 
"community caretaker" search Die secc iid requireim! -* Provo City's community caretaker 
test is that the officer's conduct must have been in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker 
function Provo City, 844 P.2d at 366. The Court defined community caretaking functions as 
"'totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relath 
violation of a criminal statute.'" kL at 363 n.l (quoting Cadv v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 
(1973) (emp: isis added)).1 
1
 In Provo City, the Court concluded that "[t]he officer was not acting within his duties 
of detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the commission of crimes. 
Therefore, we determine that the officer was acting within a bona fide community caretaker 
function." 844 P.2d at 365. 
3 
In contrast, Judge Hutchings found that, in searching Mr. Davidson, Officer Hedenstrom 
was acting partially as a law enforcer, not solely as a community caretaker: "[I]n his mind 
[Officer Hedenstrom] had two bases; Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the 
search; and exigent circumstances." R. 94. This finding was presumably drawn from Officer 
Hedenstrom's testimony that he searched Mr. Davidson because "It's a standard procedure when 
someone is arrested to search them for weapons and anything else. I was hoping to find the drug 
paraphernalia that this man had overdosed on that could help him." R. 74. In other words, 
Officer Hedenstrom searched Mr. Davidson for both community caretaking and law enforcement 
purposes.2 Because Officer Hedenstrom's search was not "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute," it was not 
in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaking function as required by Provo City.3 
CONCLUSION 
The City erroneously relies on Provo City's "community caretaker automobile stop" test 
2
 In its (Corrected) Brief of Appellee, the City states that "Judge Hutchings correctly 
ruled that the officer had a primary motivation in determining what substance the person on the 
table had ingested" and that Judge Hutchings "had plenty of facts to base this opinion on." 
(Corrected) Brief of Appellee at 8. In fact, Judge Hutchings did not categorize Officer 
Hedenstrom's conflicting motivations as primary or secondary, but simply held that because one 
of the two reasons for the search was to help the unconscious man, the search was justified. R. 
94. Moreover, the "facts" upon which the City contends Judge Hutchings based his opinion took 
place during Officer Hedenstrom's initial questioning of Mr. Davidson, not during the 
subsequent arrest and search. 
3
 The Court in Provo City recognized that some stops which are legitimate exercises of 
police community caretaker responsibilities will, nonetheless, fail to pass the specific 
requirements set forth in that case. The Court noted that such stops will "result in application of 
the exclusionary rule, while still achieving the objectives of community caretaking. This appears 
to be a legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking functions while deterring 
bogus or pretextual police activities." 844 P.2d at 365. 
4 
in analyzing the propriety of Officer Hedenstrom's warrantless search of Mr. Davidson. Instead, 
this Court should evaluate Officer Hedenstrom's search with reference to the medical emergency 
exception to the search warrant requirement, as described in Judge Greenwood's concurring 
opinion in State v. Yoden 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Greenwood, J. concurring). 
Further, this Court should reject application of that exception to the facts of this case for the 
reasons set forth in Mr. Davidson's Brief of Appellant. 
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